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ENHANCING JUDICIARY`S ABILITY TO CURB CORRUPTION - A PRACTICAL GUIDE
17
Disciplinary and criminal investigations
15.
Aspecial code of conduct shall be designed for judicial officials and its application monitored
by an independent Judicial Council. (B15)
16.
The Judicial Council should have a disciplinary role as well as provide assistance and
advice on ethical issues faced by judicial officials. (B16)
17.
Disciplinary procedures regarding judicial officials should be undertaken only with regard
to their conduct or breaches of the code of conduct, and not with regard to the content of
the cases they judge: claimants, respondents or defendants cannot bring administrative
complaints against judges who have heard their cases in lieu of an appeal. (B17)
18.
Disciplinary sanctions cannot be applied for divergent decisions in different cases, or for
decisions diverging from the ones of the superior court, if they are properly motivated. (B18)
19.
The investigation of judges and prosecutors shall be subject to special rules in order to
avoid misuse motivated by revenge of those affected by the judge’s decisions. Such rules
shall not grant judicial officials immunity from prosecution for corruption and shall not
interfere with the timely conclusion of a case. (B19)
20.
The decisions issued by the Judicial Council in disciplinary matters shall be the subject of
review by an independent court. (B20)
21.
Judges and prosecutors cannot be civilly or criminally liable for the decisions they issue,
unless there is proved corruption. (B21)
Financial independence
22.
Judicial official salaries should be established by law issued by the legislative and shall not
be subject to adjustments unless there are major fiscal reforms. (B22)
23.
Judicial official salaries cannot be subject to adjustments by the executive. (B23)
24.
Judicial salaries and pensions should be proportionate to the serious responsibility tasked
to them. They should also be proportionate to the experience, performance and professional
development of judges. Changes regarding the level of salaries and pensions, as well as
regarding the pension age shall be done on a gradual system, in order to avoid hidden
removal of undesirable judges or prosecutors. (B24)
25.
The judiciary shall have its own budget, ideally a fixed portion of GDP, which it administers
independently. (B25)
26.
The judiciary shall have a sufficient budget in order to ensure the appropriate number of
competent judicial officials and a digitalized system that allows for speedy resolution of
judicial cases and for dealing efficiently with heavy caseloads.(B26)
27.
The budget shall be sufficient to ensure the judiciary`s independence to engage any
mechanism necessary to establish the truth – the need for expertise or experts’ opinions,
witnesses hearings, valuations, seizure of assets, interpretation etc. (B27)
Independence of the judicial proceedings
28.
Cases should be distributed to different panels randomly, observing the specialization rules
for each court. (B28)
29.
The manager of the court or prosecutors` office should mostly have administrative
competences regarding the organization and functioning of the court, and shall not have
any undue interference with the management of the cases. (B29)
30.
Case removal from a judge or prosecutor shall be made only in limited situations expressly
stipulated by law. These limited situations will include the inability of a judge or prosecutor to
perform his/her duties for a period which could potentially affect the proper administration of
justice (for health, personal or professional reasons), and severe misconduct or corruption.
(B30)
31.
Judges and prosecutors should perform their duties without undue interference. (B31)
32.
Decisions of court panels shall be taken by a majority of votes, allowing for separate
opinions. (B32)
33.
Judges shall be free to express their dissenting opinions which shall be recorded as such.
(B33)